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RESTRAINING ORDERS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY 
AFTER TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK, COLORADO v. GONZALES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Domestic violence plagues the United States.  One in two women in the 
United States will experience a violent relationship at some point in her 
lifetime.1  In general, police departments treat domestic violence seriously.2  
Nevertheless, some police departments may refuse to recognize domestic 
violence as a criminal matter, or they may assign these reports a lower priority 
than other calls.3  These inadequate responses contribute to the continuing 
prevalence of domestic violence.4 In turn, victim and society both pay a heavy 
price.5 
Victims of domestic violence obviously include the women and children 
directly assaulted by their abusers.  However, society also suffers.6  Each year 
in the United States, abusers cause 18,700 workplace incidents.7  These 
incidents contribute directly to problems of workplace violence.8  However, 
 
 1. Susanne M. Browne, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to the Inadequate 
Response of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (1995) 
(citing Sarah M. Buel, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence Cases in the United States: An 
Overview, in DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN IN CRIMINAL CASES § A, at 1 (ABA Section of 
Criminal Justice & Division for Professional Education eds., 1993)). 
 2. Mike Hendricks, High Court Deals Out a Low Blow, KAN. CITY STAR, June 29, 2005, at 
B1.  At least one scholar has questioned the efficacy of this effort.  See Johanna Niemi-
Kieslainen, The Deterrent Effect of Arrest in Domestic Violence: Differentiating Between Victim 
and Perpetrator Response, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 283, 291-93 (2001).  However, in 
addition to the procedural shortcomings of the studies cited by Niemi-Kieslainen, the studies 
discussed in that article looked only at situations where the officer has discretion to arrest the 
perpetrator.  Id. at 291-92 (excluding felony arrest situations and situations where the victim 
demanded arrest).  The studies ignored the effect of arrest in situations where state law mandated 
the officer to arrest the perpetrator.  See id. at 291.  This casenote focuses on those situations 
where the officer has no discretion to make an arrest. 
 3. Browne, supra note 1, at 1298. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Janet Mickish, Domestic Violence: “Make It Your Business” A Huge Success, 33 
COLO. LAW. 49 (2004). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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abuse outside of the workplace indirectly cost employers between $3.9 billion 
and $7.6 billion in 1995 alone.9 
Abusers usually trap their victims in an escalating pattern of violence.10  
Abusers usually begin abusing their victim with a slap or a shove.11  The 
victim will convince herself that this behavior was abnormal and unlikely to 
happen again.12  The abuser then becomes progressively more violent. 13  The 
abuser claims that the violence is unintentional, and the victim is usually in no 
position to contradict that claim.14 
The abuser projects an image to those outside of the relationship designed 
to isolate his victim.15  He will sabotage his victim’s ties to friends and family 
in order to socially isolate his victim.16  Those aware of the abuse will usually 
avoid contact with the victim.17  The isolated victim thus becomes increasingly 
dependent on her abuser and unable to leave the situation.18 
Unfortunately, society’s response to domestic violence may help the 
abuser trap his victim.19  Ineffective interventions by friends, police, and the 
courts may convince a victim that no one will treat her abuse seriously.20  Even 
if she does manage to leave, the abuser will often cut off his victim’s financial 
resources, forcing her to rely on often inadequate public assistance.21 
For the last thirty years, the United States has employed several tactics to 
combat the problem of domestic violence.22  Beginning in the 1970s states 
began to fund safe houses and shelters for domestic violence victims.23  Still, 
police departments routinely trained their officers to treat domestic violence 
situations as a private matter.24  Frustrated by this situation, state legislatures 
have made several attempts to help victims find protection within the legal 
 
 9. Mickish, supra note 5, at 49.  These losses can be attributed to lost productivity, 
absenteeism, tardiness, health costs, employee turnover, and poor customer service.  Id. 
 10. Browne, supra note 1, at 1295-96. 
 11. Id. at 1295. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1295-96. 
 15. Id. at 1296. 
 16. Browne, supra note 1, at 1296. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1296-97. 
 20. Id. at 1296. 
 21. Id. at 1296.  The abused, already suffering low self-esteem, may view this move to 
public assistance as yet another source of shame.  Id. 
 22. See generally Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer?  Do We Know That for Sure?: 
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 7 (2004). 
 23. Id. at 9. 
 24. Id. at 13.  Often, police officers would simply ask the perpetrator to take a walk to cool 
down.  Id.  Officers were told that police intervention would not solve the problem.  Id. 
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system.  First, a majority of states passed laws creating civil protection orders 
and changed custody laws.25  Second, many states passed mandatory arrest 
laws.26  Finally, some prosecuting attorney offices have enacted policies 
allowing prosecutors to pursue criminal charges, even where the victim of the 
domestic violence has recanted her testimony or has refused to testify against 
the abuser.27 
 
 25. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 10.  Civil protective orders allowed victims to file for a 
protective order by individually petitioning the court. Id. They did not have to rely on police 
intervention.  Id.  Custody law changes occurred when states required courts to consider 
allegations of domestic violence when deciding custody disputes.  Id. at 13. 
 26. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530(a)(1) (2004) (“a peace officer . . . shall arrest a 
person if the officer has probable cause to believe the person has . . . committed domestic 
violence . . . .”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601.B (2000) (The officer “shall arrest” a 
domestic violence perpetrator who has inflicted physical injury or used or exhibited a deadly 
weapon or dangerous object; in all other cases, the officer “may” arrest the perpetrator.); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1) (West 2006) (“the officer shall . . . arrest. . .the person without a 
warrant . . . whether or not the violation occurred in the presence of the arresting officer.”); KAN.  
STAT. ANN. § 22-2307 (1995) (“written policies shall include . . . [a] statement directing that the 
officers shall make an arrest when they have probable cause to believe that a crime is being 
committed or has been committed.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.2(e) (West 2006) (“peace 
officer shall arrest without a warrant . . . a person whom the peace officer has probable cause to 
believe has violated [a protective] order . . . .”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(3)(a) (West 2000) 
(“shall arrest . . . when he has probable cause to believe that the person has, within twenty-four 
(24) hours of the such arrest, knowingly committed . . . an act of domestic violence . . . . ”) ; NEV.  
REV. STAT. § 171.137.1 (2005) (abuser must be arrested if he has committed violence against a 
spouse, former spouse, any family member related by blood or marriage, anyone sharing a 
residence, anyone in a dating relationship, and co-parents of the abuser’s children); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 173-B:9.I(a) (2001) (“peace officers shall arrest the defendant” if he or she violates 
a protective order); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21 (West 2005) (victim must claim to be a victim of 
domestic violence before the officer must to arrest the perpetrator); N.C. GEN STAT. § 50B-4.1(b)  
(2006) (arrest mandated “if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person knowingly 
has violated a valid protective order”); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055(2)(a) (2001) (the officer “shall 
arrest” if he has “probable cause to believe that an assault has occurred . . . or to believe that one 
such person has placed the other in fear of imminent serious physical injury . . . .”).  Not all states 
have adopted this approach.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (1995) (the officer has discretion 
whether or not to arrest, but must make a written report of the alleged incident); FLA. STAT. ANN.  
§ 741.29(2) (West 2005) (officer must make a written report, but has discretion to make an 
arrest).  Some states have found a middle ground.  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.7529 
(LexisNexis 1999) (officer must arrest a person who violates a restraining order, but if the victim 
has no restraining order, then the officer may only arrest the abuser if he has violated some 
statute).  Colorado’s mandatory arrest statute was the central issue in Town of Castle Rock, 
Colorado v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
 27. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 16.  In these situations, law enforcement treats the case like 
any other case where the victim is unavailable, such as homicide cases.  Id. at 17.  The police will 
collect physical evidence and witness statements to prove the case, rather than rely on the 
victim’s testimony.  Id. 
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These remedies have not been universally successful.  Domestic violence 
victims rarely utilize their state’s civil protective order statute.28  Mandatory 
arrest laws have increased police responsiveness to domestic violence, but they 
have proven inadequate thus far.29  Finally, even where prosecutors pursue 
charges without the victim’s consent, the victim may see negative 
consequences.  For example, if a prosecuting attorney’s office pursues a “hard 
no-drop” policy, they will require victims to testify regardless of their desire to 
do so.30  In such a situation, the prosecutor may subpoena and even arrest a 
victim to compel her to testify.31  Such a policy may further traumatize the 
victim.  If the prosecutor adopts a “soft no-drop” policy, the victim may choose 
not to testify.32  In these cases, the lack of victim testimony may cause the 
prosecutor to drop the case for lack of good evidence, making the policy 
moot.33 
This casenote will examine the effect of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales34 on domestic violence 
victims.  This case effectively dispelled, in dicta, any notion that a victim of 
domestic violence may sue a police department for violating a state’s 
mandatory arrest statute under U.S.C. § 1983, where the victim claimed a 
property interest in her restraining order.35  This casenote suggests that 
domestic violence victims may still have a cause of action under an equal 
protection claim under § 1983.  It then suggests that subjecting police 
departments to civil liability under state law when they ignore restraining 
orders may be the best option to fight domestic violence. 
II.  FACTS IN THE GONZALES CASE 
On May 21, 1999, Jessica Gonzales requested and received a restraining 
order against her husband in conjunction with her divorce proceedings. 36  The 
order, served on Gonzales’s husband on June 4, “commanded him not to 
‘molest, or disturb the peace of [respondent] or of any child,’ and to remain 
 
 28. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 11.  Only 20% of domestic violence victims have sought 
protective orders.  Id. 
 29. See id. at 15.  For example, in 1990, the District of Columbia police department only 
arrested someone on 5% of their domestic violence calls. Id. By 1996, the arrest rate climbed to 
41%.  Id.  Note that despite the 36% increase in responsiveness, the police department still 
arrested a perpetrator less than half the time.  Id. 
 30. Id. at 17. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 17. 
 34. 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
 35. Id. at 2802-03. 
 36. Id. at 2800. 
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100 yards from [Gonzales’s] family home at all times.”37  The bottom of this 
form stated that “IMPORTANT NOTICES FOR RESTRAINED PARTIES 
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS” were printed on the reverse 
side.38  The reverse contained the following standard language: 
NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS: YOU SHALL USE 
EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE THIS RETRAINING 
ORDER.  YOU SHALL ARREST, OR, IF AN ARREST WOULD BE 
IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK A WARRANT 
FOR THE ARREST OF THE RESTRAINED PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE 
INFORMATION AMOUNTING TO PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE 
RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED OR ATTEMPTED TO 
VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER AND THE RESTRAINED 
PERSON HAS BEEN PROPERLY SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS 
ORDER OR HAS RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE EXISTENCE OF 
THIS ORDER.39 
On June 4, the state trial court made this restraining order permanent.40 
On June 22, at around 5:00 p.m. or 5:30 p.m., Gonzales’s husband 
kidnapped the children (aged 10, 9, and 7) while they were playing outside 
Gonzales’s home.41  He had not arranged for this visit.42  At 7:30 p.m., 
Gonzales called the Castle Rock, Colorado Police Department, suspecting that 
her husband had taken the children.43  When officers responded, she showed 
them a copy of the restraining order and asked that they return her children to 
her immediately.44  The officers told her that they could do nothing.45  They 
told her to call the police again if the children were still gone by 10:00 p.m.46 
At 8:30 p.m., Gonzales talked to her husband on his cellular phone. 47  He 
told her that he had the children at a Denver amusement park.48  Gonzales 
called the police again, asking them to check the amusement park for her 
 
 37. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2800-01 (citing Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 366 
F.3d 1093, 1143 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
 38. Id. at 2801 (emphasis in original). 
 39. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 40. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2801.  The order also allowed Mr. Gonzales to see his children 
on alternate weekends, for two weeks during the summer, and “‘upon reasonable notice,’ for a 
mid-week dinner visit ‘arranged by the parties.’”  Id.  The order also allowed him to visit the 
home for such “parenting time.”  Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2801. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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husband’s vehicle and to put out an “[all points bulletin]” for her husband.49  
The officer on the line refused, telling her to wait until 10:00 p.m. to see if her 
husband returned.50 
Gonzales followed these directions, calling the police yet again at 10:10 
p.m. when her husband failed to return the children.51  This time, the police 
department told her to wait until midnight before calling again.52  Again, 
Gonzales followed orders and called at midnight.53  At 12:10 a.m., Gonzales 
went to her husband’s apartment and called the police a fifth time when she 
found that nobody was present.54  Police told Gonzales to wait for police to 
arrive, but (perhaps tired of waiting on the police) she went to the police 
station to file an incident report at 12:50 a.m.55  The police officer who took 
the incident report made absolutely no effort to enforce the restraining order; 
instead, he took his dinner break.56 
Finally, Gonzales’s husband forced the police to react.  At 3:20 a.m., he 
arrived at the police station and opened fire with a semiautomatic weapon.57  
Police returned fire, killing him.58  Inside of his truck, police found the dead 
bodies of Gonzales’s three daughters.59  Mr. Gonzales had already murdered 
his three children.60 
Gonzales sued the Town of Castle Rock under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming 
that the town violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution because the police department “had ‘an 
official policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of 
restraining order violations’ and ‘tolerate[d] the non-enforcement of restraining 
orders by its police officers.’”61  Gonzales further alleged that the town acted 
“willfully, recklessly, or with such gross negligence as to indicate wanton 
disregard and deliberate indifference to” her civil rights.62  The district court 
granted the town’s motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
 
 49. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2801-02. 
 50. Id. at 2802. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2802. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2802. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802. 
 62. Id. 
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Circuit reversed, finding that Gonzales had alleged a cognizable procedural 
due process claim.63 
At the time of filing, the Supreme Court had not yet addressed the validity 
of a due process claim in a domestic violence situation.64  Because Colorado 
was one of fifteen states mandating arrest for domestic violence offenses and 
one of nineteen states mandating arrest for violating domestic restraining 
orders,65 this case provided an opportunity for the Court to recognize § 1983 as 
a powerful tool in the fight against domestic violence.  Instead, the Court’s 
opinion narrowed the list of possible legal solutions for domestic violence 
victims. 
III.  HISTORY 
The Gonzales case turned on whether Gonzales had a property interest in 
the restraining order against her husband.66  In order to have a property interest 
in such a benefit, one must have “more than a unilateral expectation of it.  
[One] must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”67  The 
hallmark of this property “is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, 
which cannot be removed except ‘for cause.’”68  For example, a creditor has 
such an interest in a deceased person’s estate with an unpaid bill.69  State law 
may create such a right to public education.70  A statute granting an operating 
license revocable only “for cause” creates such an interest.71  However, if the 
statute grants wide discretion to revoke such a license, the licensee has no 
property interest.72  To tell the difference, a court should look to the extent to 
which the statute uses mandatory language.73 
 
 63. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802.  The Tenth Circuit found that the repeated use of the word 
“shall” made enforcement of the protective order statute mandatory on police officers.  See 
Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 64. See Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2803 (“As the Court of Appeals recognized, we left a similar 
question unanswered in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs . . .”). 
 65. Id. at 2817-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 2803-04. 
 67. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 68. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).  Once a court finds this 
characteristic, “the types of interests protected as ‘property’ are varied and, as often as not, 
intangible, relating ‘to the whole domain of social and economic fact.’”  Id. 
 69. Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988).  However, such a 
property interest only protects the holder against state action, not private action.  Id. 
 70. Handberry v. Thompson, 436 F.3d 52, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2006).  However, such a right does  
not necessarily continue when the individual is incarcerated.  Id. at 71. 
 71. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1164-65. 
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IV.  DUE PROCESS CLAIMS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
no state “shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”74  Due process of the law originally secured English citizens 
“against the arbitrary action of the crown.”75  42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits 
anyone from acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, or any State” from depriving or causing to deprive any person of the 
United States of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws.”  This statute “deter[s] state actors from using the badge 
of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and 
to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”76 
In Board of Regents v. Roth77 an assistant professor brought suit against his 
employer, Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh, because the university did not 
rehire him when his faculty appointment expired after one year.78  Under 
Wisconsin law at that time, a first year teacher was entitled to nothing more 
than a one year appointment.79  Instead, state law left the decision of whether 
to rehire a first year teacher to the “unfettered discretion” of university 
officials.80  The Court recognized that due process in property rights extends 
“beyond mere ownership in real estate, chattels, or money.”81  Property 
interests may take many forms.82  However, in order to have a property interest 
in a benefit, “a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire 
for it.  He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.  He must, instead, 
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”83  “It is a purpose of the ancient 
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their 
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.”84  Property 
interests are not created by the Constitution.85  Instead, they are created by 
rules or understandings stemming from state law.86  The Court found that the 
plaintiff’s appointment for one year was to terminate, with absolutely no 
 
 74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 75. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 518 (1885). 
 76. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 
(1978)). 
 77. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 78. Id. at 566. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 567. 
 81. Id. at 571-72 (citing Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 
U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). 
 82. Id. at 576. 
 83. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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provision for renewal whatsoever.87  Thus, he had no interest in re-
employment once his term expired.88 
Six years after Roth, the Supreme Court decided Memphis Light, Gas and 
Water Division v. Craft.89  In Craft, a homeowner in Memphis, Tennessee, 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages against a municipal 
utility, claiming that the utility company terminated the homeowner’s services 
without due process of the law.90  The district court concluded that the 
homeowner’s entitlement to continued utility service did not implicate a 
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.91  The court of 
appeals reversed in part.92  The Supreme Court held that, although the 
underlying substantive property interest is created by state law, “federal 
constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 
‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”93  
Here, Tennessee state law did not allow a public utility to terminate service “at 
will.”94  The availability of causes of action to enjoin a wrongful threat or 
recover damages shows that Tennessee recognized the plaintiffs’ claims as a 
protected interest.95  Because the Fourteenth Amendment protects more than 
undisputed ownership, the plaintiffs asserted a legitimate claim of entitlement, 
even though their claims of wrongful termination were disputed.96 
In Craft, the Court held that the state must hold some kind of hearing 
before depriving someone of his property interests.97  To determine what kind 
of hearing is required, the state must weigh three factors: 1) “the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action,” 2) “the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and 3) “the 
government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and the 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement would 
entail.”98  The utility violated plaintiff’s due process rights because it failed to 
provide the plaintiff with notice reasonably calculated to alert the plaintiff to 
an administrative procedure to consider the complaint, and it failed to actually 
consider the plaintiff’s complaints.99 
 
 87. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 436 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 90. Id. at 3. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 9. 
 94. Id. at 11. 
 95. Craft, 436 U.S. at 11. 
 96. Id. at 11-12. 
 97. Id. at 16. 
 98. Id. at 17-18. 
 99. Id. at 22. 
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In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,100 the 
mother of a 4-year-old boy severely beaten and permanently injured by his 
father brought suit against the local Department of Social Services.101  The 
mother claimed, after the state court awarded custody to the child’s father, that 
state authorities ignored strong evidence that the boy’s father severely abused 
him.102  Over the course of eighteen months, the agency received numerous 
reports of abuse from a local hospital because the boy kept receiving 
suspicious injuries.103  Furthermore, the boy’s father would not follow the 
voluntary agreement by which the agency agreed to keep the boy in his 
mother’s custody.104  Finally, after twenty-six months, the boy’s father beat his 
son so badly that he fell into a life-threatening coma.105  While the boy 
survived, he suffered brain damage so severe that he will spend the rest of his 
life in an institution for the profoundly retarded.106 
The boy’s mother brought a § 1983 claim against the local agency and 
several of its employees.107  The district court granted summary judgment for 
the agency.108  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Due Process 
Clause does not require a state or local governmental entity to protect its 
citizens from “private violence, or other mishaps not attributable to the conduct 
of its employees.”109  The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to 
resolve a split between circuits on this issue.110 
The Court did not address the issue of whether the child protection statute 
entitled the boy to receive protective services in the terms of the statute 
because she did not properly preserve the issue.111  The Court noted that the 
plaintiff relied on the substantive, not the procedural, component of the Due 
Process Clause.112  The Court expressly held that “nothing in the language of 
the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and 
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”113  The Clause 
limits the state’s power to act; it does not guarantee a minimal level of safety 
 
 100. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 101. Id. at 191. 
 102. Id. at 193. 
 103. Id. at 192-93. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 193. 
 106. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 193-94 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 
298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
 110. Id. at 194. 
 111. Id. at 195 n.2. 
 112. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
 113. Id. 
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and security.114  The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to protect the 
people from the state, not to coerce the state to protect people from each 
other.115  Thus, due process cases generally recognize no right to governmental 
aid, even where that aid “may be necessary to secure the life, liberty, or 
property interests which the government itself may not deprive from the 
individual.”116  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the state 
created a special relationship such that the state acquired an affirmative duty, 
enforceable through the Due Process Clause, to protect the boy in a reasonably 
competent fashion.117  The Court held that only when a state takes a person 
into custody and holds him there against his will does the state owe a duty to 
assume responsibility for his safety and general well-being.118  The rationale is 
simple: when the state takes affirmative action to deprive a person of the 
ability to care for himself, it must in return offer basic human needs.119  The 
Court did not address the basic weakness in the Government’s analysis: that 
the state, through its family court system, assigned custody of the boy to his 
father, limiting the ability of the boy to care for himself.120  The Court noted 
that the plaintiff may have a claim under tort law, outside of the Due Process 
Clause.121 
Where a state does deprive a citizen of liberty, a policy must contain 
“explicitly mandatory language” before it creates a liberty interest.122  In 
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson,123 state regulations allowed 
prison officials to deny visitation where a “visitor’s presence in the institution 
would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution’s security or 
interfere with [its] orderly operation.”124  The Court held that this regulation 
lacked the necessary mandatory language to create a liberty interest for the 
institution’s inmates.125 
 
 114. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. 
 115. Id. at 196. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 197-98. 
 118. Id. at 199-200. 
 119. Id. at 200. 
 120. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191-203. 
 121. Id. at 201-02. 
 122. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 464. 
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V.  DISCUSSION 
A. The Gonzales Decision 
In response to Castle Rock’s failure to enforce her restraining order, 
Gonzales filed a § 1983 suit against the Town of Castle Rock, Colorado, and 
against three individual police officers.126  Defendants filed a Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; the district court granted this 
motion before defendants answered the complaint.127  The district court held 
that, regardless of whether Gonzales was relying on the procedural or 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, she had failed to state a 
claim for which relief could be granted.128 
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the 
individual officers as defendants.129  However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s dismissal of the case against the City of Castle Rock.130  The 
Tenth Circuit originally found that Gonzales failed to show that the city had 
violated any of her substantive due process rights when its police department 
failed to respond to her complaints.131  However, on a rehearing en banc, the 
Tenth Circuit held that Gonzales had a protected procedural due process right 
because she had a property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her 
restraining order.132  The Tenth Circuit then found that Gonzales had 
sufficiently alleged that the town could have deprived her of her due process 
rights because the town failed to hear or seriously entertain her request to 
enforce the restraining order and protect her interests in it. 133  The Tenth 
Circuit then reversed the district Court and remanded the case for further 
hearings.134 
 
 126. Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2802 & n.3 (2005).  
Gonzales claimed that the town failed to properly train the officers to respond to domestic 
violence calls.  Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 127. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 2802 n.3.  The court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity in 
their actions as police officers.  Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1263.  Gonzales never claimed to have a special relationship with 
the police department which would entitle her to such a claim.  Id. at 1262.  Gonzales also failed 
to show affirmative action (as opposed to mere inaction) by the police department which actually 
created a danger.  Id. at 1263. 
 132. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2802. 
 133. Id.  The appellate court did not find that the city had violated her procedural due process 
rights as a matter of law; it only stated that Gonzales was entitled to prove her case.  Id. 
 134. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1267.  The Tenth Circuit left open the questions of whether 
Gonzales could establish municipal liability or if Castle Rock was entitled to qualified immunity.  
Id. at 1266-67. 
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B. Scalia’s Majority Opinion 
Justice Scalia, writing for seven Justices, delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court.135  Scalia pointed out that the Court in DeShaney left open a 
question similar to the one posed by Gonzales: whether a statute which 
provided for specific services entitled the recipient of those services to 
protection under the Due Process Clause.136  The Court held that the 
procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect all 
“benefits.”137  Instead, a person “clearly must have more than an abstract need 
or desire . . . .  He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to 
it.”138 
The Court based its decision on a state law determination, not a Due 
Process Clause analysis.139  In a due process analysis, a court will first look to 
see if a state statute has provided the plaintiff with a property interest. 140  The 
court will then ask if that property interest is sufficient enough to warrant 
protection under the Due Process Clause.141  Such entitlements are created by 
state law, not the Constitution.142  The Court held that a benefit is not a 
protected entitlement if officials have discretion to grant or deny it.143 
On the state law issue, the Court refused to defer to the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding.  The Tenth Circuit held that the statute created an entitlement to 
enforcement where a “‘court issued restraining order . . . specifically dictated 
that its terms must be enforced’ . . . and a ‘state statute command[ed]’ 
enforcement of the order when certain objective conditions were met.”144  The 
presumption that the Court should defer to a federal court as to the law of the 
state within its jurisdiction was not appropriate here because the Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion “did not draw upon a deep well of state-specific 
expertise.”145  The Tenth Circuit opinion relied only on language from the 
restraining order, the statutory text, and a state legislative hearing transcript. 146  
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit relied on decisions from Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, Oregon, and Tennessee, not Colorado.147  Finally, the Court 
 
 135. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2800. 
 136. Id. at 2803 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
195 n.2 (1989)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
 139. Id. at 2804. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2804. 
 142. Id. at 2803. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 2803-04 (quoting Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 366 F.3d 1093, 
1101 (10th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). 
 145. Id. at 2804. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2804. 
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reasoned that if it were to accept the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, the Court 
would be faced with conclusively deciding a federal constitutional question: 
whether such an entitlement constituted property under the Due Process 
Clause.148  The Court decided to take the less drastic step of ruling on the state 
law issue.149 
The Court ultimately found that the critical language in determining 
whether Gonzales had an interest in the restraining order existed in the 
restraining order statute, not the actual restraining order itself.150  At the time 
of the incident, the Colorado statute stated that: 
(a) A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining 
order. 
(b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impracticable under 
the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the 
peace officer has information amounting to probable cause that: 
(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a 
protection order; and 
(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a copy of the 
protection order or . . . has received actual notice of the existence and 
substance of such order. 
(c) In making the probable cause determination . . . a peace officer shall 
assume that the information received from the registry is accurate.  A peace 
officer shall enforce a valid protection order whether or not there is a record of 
the protection order in the registry.151 
One lawmaker stated that, “[t]he entire criminal justice system must act in a 
consistent manner, which does not now occur.  The police must make probable 
cause arrests.”152  Still, the Court did not find that this statute made 
enforcement of restraining orders mandatory because of a long history of 
police discretion and the understanding that language in such statutes cannot be 
read literally.153  A true mandate of police action would require language 
stronger than “‘shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order’ 
(or even ‘shall arrest . . . or . . . seek a warrant’).”154  In situations such as 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2804-05. 
 151. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3) (1999) (emphases added). 
 152. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2805 n.6 (quoting Tr. of Colo. House Judiciary Hearings on H. 
B. 1253, Feb. 15, 1994) (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. at 2805-06. 
 154. Id. at 2806. 
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these, where the suspected violator is not present and his whereabouts are 
unknown, the necessity for discretion is particularly apparent.155 
The Court addressed the arguments raised by the two dissenting Justices.  
While the dissent points out that some states have found their domestic 
violence mandatory arrest statutes to be more mandatory than traditional 
mandatory arrest statutes, the dissent fails to clarify how the mandatory arrest 
provision applies in situations where the offender is not present to be 
arrested.156  There will be some situations where an arrest is not possible, such 
as when the offender is not home.157  Nor does Gonzales specify the precise 
means by which the police are mandated to act in this situation: arrest the 
husband, seek an arrest warrant for the husband, or have them use “every 
reasonable means, up to and including arrest,” to enforce the order.158  If the 
mandate is for seeking a warrant, this is an entitlement to procedure, not 
adequate enough to support standing in a § 1983 case.159 
Finally, even if the Colorado statute did make police action mandatory, this 
would not have necessarily given Gonzales an entitlement to enforcement of 
the restraining order.160  Making state actions mandatory may serve legitimate 
purposes other than to confer a benefit on an individual or a class of people.161 
Again addressing concerns raised by the dissenting Justices, the Court 
noted that Gonzales did not claim any contractual right to enforcement of the 
statute.162  Instead, the statute specifically gave Gonzales the power to initiate 
contempt proceedings against her husband in a civil action or to request a 
prosecuting attorney to initiate contempt proceedings if the order was issued in 
a criminal action.163 
Although the Court did not base its decision on a Due Process Clause 
analysis,164 it did find in dicta that even if Colorado law did confer an 
entitlement to Gonzales, this entitlement would not necessarily have been 
property for purposes of the Due Process Clause.165  The Court did not defer to 
the Tenth Circuit on whether this entitlement constitutes a property interest for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.166  Instead, the Court held that federal 
constitutional law determines whether an interest rises to a property interest 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2806-07. 
 157. Id. at 2807. 
 158. Id. at 2807. 
 159. Id. at 2808. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2808. 
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protected by the Due Process Clause.167  The right claimed by Gonzales did 
not resemble traditional property rights.168  Here, the property interest would 
arise incidentally, not out of some unique government service, but out of a 
function that government actors have always performed: arresting people they 
have probable cause to believe have committed a criminal offense.169  While 
Gonzales may have had a private right to contract with a third party for her 
protection, she would not have had the power to arrest her husband.170  Nor 
would she have the power to obtain an arrest warrant on her own.171 
The Court distinguished “indirect” benefits from “direct” benefits.172  
Withdrawal of direct benefits, such as financial payments under Medicaid for 
medical services, triggers protection of the Due Process Clause,173 while 
withdrawal of indirect benefits does not deprive a person of any interest in life, 
liberty, or property.174  The Court concluded that “[t]he benefit that a third 
party may receive from having someone arrested generally does not trigger 
protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor its 
‘substantive’” components.175  Ultimately, the Court recommended that states 
may provide victims with enforceable remedies under state law.176 
C. Souter’s Concurrence 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred with the majority of the 
Court.177  Justice Souter agreed with the majority that Gonzales had not shown 
a violation of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.178  Courts 
generally grant police discretion not to enforce the law.179  In comparison, no 
one could argue that Gonzales had the power to order the police not to arrest 
her husband.180  Gonzales’s argument was unconventional because she claimed 
federal procedural protection under a state law benefit, which is itself 
procedural.181  Justice Souter pointed out that “[t]he Due Process Clause 
extends procedural protection to guard against . . . deprivation[s] . . . of 
 
 167. Id. at 2803-04 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 
(1978)). 
 168. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2809. 
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 170. Id. at 2809 n.12. 
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 172. Id. at 2810. 
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 174. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2810. 
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 176. Id. at 2810. 
 177. Id. at 2811 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2811. 
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substantive state law property rights[,] . . .  [b]ut Gonzales claim[ed] a property 
interest in a state-mandated process in and of itself.”182  Due process is not an 
end in itself; instead, it is designed to protect substantive interests.183  In 
distinguishing substance and procedure, Justice Souter stated that “[p]roperty 
cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation.”184  “State 
rules of executive procedure . . . may be nothing more than rules of executive 
procedure.”185  Thus, property rights are distinguishable from the procedural 
obligations imposed to protect them.186  Gonzales sought to change the scope 
of federal due process by replacing federal process for state process.187  
Gonzales could not distinguish between the object of her entitlement and the 
process she sought to protect it.188  Accepting Gonzales’s argument would 
“federalize every mandatory state-law direction to executive officers whose 
performance on the job can be vitally significant to individuals affected by 
it.”189 
D. Stevens’s Dissent 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.190  They framed the 
issue more narrowly than the “far-ranging” arguments of the parties and their 
amici.191  They framed the issue as whether the restraining order entered by the 
trial court created a property interest protected from arbitrary deprivation by 
the Due Process Clause.192 
Justice Stevens stated that it was clear that neither the Constitution nor any 
federal statute granted Gonzales or her children any entitlement to police 
protection.193  Neither did any Colorado statute presumptively create such an 
entitlement for an ordinary citizen.194  However, Gonzales could easily have 
entered into a contract with a private security company to provide 
protection.195  Gonzales’s interest in such a contract would certainly constitute 
property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.196  Thus, if Colorado 
performed the functional equivalent by granting Gonzales an entitlement to 
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mandatory individual protection by her local police, that right would also 
qualify as property entitled to Due Process Clause protection.197  Gonzales’s 
allegations that local police ignored her request to enforce the restraining order 
provide her with a § 1983 remedy against that police force, even if Colorado 
law does not provide specifically for such a private cause of action.198  Stevens 
asserted, “The central question in this case is therefore whether, as a matter of 
Colorado law, respondent had a right to police assistance comparable to the 
right she would have possessed to any other service the government or a 
private firm might have undertaken to provide.”199 
Justice Stevens criticized the majority for failing to defer this question to a 
more “qualified tribunal[]” and for ignoring its own “settled practice.” 200  The 
old policy, he said, is more efficient, and this policy reflects the belief that state 
district courts and appellate courts are more familiar and more able to interpret 
the laws of their respective states.201  Only in rare occasions has the Court 
declined to show this deference.202  A court could plausibly read “‘shall use 
every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order;’ and ‘shall arrest’”203 as 
mandatory; the majority clearly did not show that such a reading is “clearly 
wrong.”204 
Justice Stevens recommended certifying the question to the Colorado 
Supreme Court.205  This was because “[p]rinciples of federalism and comity 
favor giving Colorado’s high court the opportunity to answer important 
questions of state law.”206  By certifying a dispositive state law issue, the Court 
could rely on its wise policy of avoiding unnecessary adjudication of difficult 
questions of constitutional law.207  Finally, certification would promote judicial 
economy and fairness for all parties.208  Justice Stevens observed that the 
Colorado Supreme Court could overturn the United State Supreme Court and 
hold that the statute did provide Gonzales with a property interest in the 
enforcement of the restraining order.209 
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 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
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Justice Stevens then turned to the majority’s “rather superficial analysis of 
the merits.”210  The Court placed undue weight on other statutes seemingly 
mandating police enforcement, but the result was to preserve police 
discretion.211  By doing so, the Court has “‘give[n] short shrift’ to the unique 
case of ‘mandatory arrest’ provisions in domestic violence” statutes. 212 Many 
states have passed these statutes in the last twenty-five years with the 
“‘unmistakable goal’ of eliminating police discretion in this area.”213  The 
Court’s formalistic analysis also failed to take into account that the statute was 
designed to protect a narrow class of persons, beneficiaries of these restraining 
orders.214  Finally, “a citizen’s property interest in a commitment to provide 
police enforcement in specific circumstances is ‘just as concrete and worthy of 
protection’ as her interest in any other important service which the government 
or a private firm has undertaken to provide.”215 
Colorado passed this statute along with several other states in an effort to 
eradicate police underenforcement in domestic violence cases by mandating 
arrests.216  In response to police departments viewing domestic violence as a 
private matter and consequently assigning them lower priority status, many 
states followed the example of the Minneapolis police department by 
mandating arrest when an officer has probable cause to believe that a domestic 
assault has occurred or that someone has violated a protection order.217  The 
purpose of these statutes was to remove police discretion.218  Thus, it is hard to 
imagine what the Court had in mind when it requested “some stronger 
indication from the Colorado Legislature.”219 The majority’s opinion is 
especially brazen, given the trend in many states to interpret their statutes as 
eliminating police discretion.220 
The majority called for Gonzales to describe the “precise means of 
enforcement,” but this question is a “red herring.”221  The statute specifically 
requires either an arrest or an arrest warrant.222  The crucial point is not 
whether the enforcement in the case was an arrest or an arrest warrant (as the 
answer to this question probably changed through the night as Gonzales gave 
more information about her husband’s whereabouts); it is that “[the police] 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2817 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 219. Id. at 2818. 
 220. Id. at 2818-19. 
 221. Id. at 2819. 
 222. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW 
118 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:99 
lacked the discretion to do nothing.”223  For example, if a state required the 
provision of healthcare if a person met certain income requirements, no one 
could say that person lacked entitlement to that healthcare because the form of 
that entitlement will change depending on the situation.224 
Importantly, Gonzales was entitled to enforcement of the restraining order 
because she received the individual benefit from a state court under a state 
statute benefiting a narrow class of people.225  She specifically applied for the 
restraining order, and the state judge found a risk of “irreparable injury” and 
“physical or emotional harm” if the husband were to return to the Gonzales 
home.226  Because the statute only operates when a judge grants an identified 
individual its benefits, the majority’s finding that the statute provides 
“incidental” or “indirect” benefits misses the mark.227  “[D]omestic restraining 
order statutes ‘identify with precision when, to whom, and under what 
circumstances police protection must be afforded.’”228 
Because Colorado law clearly eliminates police discretion, Gonzales has 
demonstrated the “legitimate claim of entitlement” of enforcement required to 
show a Due Process Clause property right.229  Clearly, property interests 
extend beyond “mere ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”230  The 
Court has previously found property interests in several state-conferred 
benefits and services, including disability benefits, public education, utility 
services, government employment, and some state procedures, such as fair 
procedures before a driver’s license may be revoked pending the adjudication 
of an accident claim.231  It is the purpose of property “to protect those claims 
upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily 
undermined.”232  Here, Colorado guaranteed Gonzales the protection of 
enforcement of the restraining order, a promise on which she relied.233 
At the very least, the Due Process Clause requires that the relevant state 
decision-maker listen to the claimant and then apply the relevant criteria in 
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reaching his decision.234  Here, the police ignored Gonzales’s complaints.235  
The police had a “callous policy of failing to properly respond” to similar 
violations.236  The police department provided Gonzales with nothing more 
than a “sham or a pretense” of process.237 
VI.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
The Court based its decision on a determination of state law.238  
Consequently, a Colorado state court could overturn the U.S. Supreme Court 
on the issue of whether or not Gonzales had a property interest in seeing her 
restraining order enforced.239  The Court found that in statutory interpretation, 
“shall” does not apply to police officers like it does to other government 
officials.240  The Court’s reasoning here confused discretion in how to meet the 
requirements of the statute with whether to meet the requirements of the 
statute.241  Justice Stevens pointed this out in his dissent when he stated that, 
under the Colorado statute, the police lacked discretion to do nothing. 242  The 
Court’s holding here may not be universally upheld in all state courts with 
similar mandatory arrest provisions.243 
The Court went further in dicta to say that, even if Gonzales did have a 
property interest in the restraining order, it did not meet the kind of “legitimate 
expectation” that would prevent the state from removing such a benefit without 
the due process required under the Fourteenth Amendment.244  The Court’s 
distinction between direct and indirect rights initially seems convincing.245  
However, this analysis did not address the holding in Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co.,246 which stated that property interests are, “often as not,” 
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intangible.  Such property interests often encompass the “whole domain of 
social and economic fact.”247  By quickly dispensing of Gonzales’s property 
claim by labeling the benefit “indirect,” the Court may have seriously limited 
the rights of many citizens, not just those claiming an interest in a restraining 
order.248 
In addition, the Court probably erred by even deciding the state law issue 
of whether the statute gave Gonzales a property interest in seeing the 
restraining order enforced.  From a practical standpoint, the Supreme Court 
will have wasted its time if the Colorado Supreme Court disagrees with the 
majority’s state law analysis.249  From a legal standpoint, the Court failed to 
convincingly outline its reasons for refusing to defer to the Tenth Circuit’s 
determination on this issue.250 
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion is more convincing.  Justice Souter 
points out that Gonzales attempted to claim a property right through a 
procedural rule.251  Souter claimed that Gonzales could not distinguish 
between the object of her entitlement and the process she sought to protect 
it.252 
However, this may not necessarily be the case.  Here, one could view the 
“object of her entitlement” as the guarantee that her abuser will be arrested if 
he violates the restraining order.  At first glance, this may appear to be 
identical to the process she claims she was denied.  Yet, the Court’s majority 
opinion contained the answer to this argument when it claimed that the statute 
granted the officer discretion in how to make every “reasonable effort”253 to 
enforce the restraining order under the statute.  The Colorado statute required 
more than just a mere arrest.254  It mandated that the officer use “every 
reasonable means” to enforce Gonzales’ restraining order.255  Thus, Gonzales’s 
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Similarly the Second Circuit has held that a public education is a protected property interest for 
non-incarcerated individuals where state statute provides for such an education for 16-21 year 
olds.  Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 352-355 (2006).  Under the Court’s analysis, this 
public education may be considered an “indirect” benefit unworthy of protection because states 
have traditionally provided public education to all of its citizens.  Id. 
 249. See Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2815-16 & nn.3-6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 250. See id. at 2814. 
 251. Id. at 2812 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 252. Id. 
 253. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (2005). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
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property right was for the police department to enforce her restraining order.  
The process by which this right is protected is the officer’s method of 
enforcing the restraining order.256  By denying Gonzales a police response, the 
police department deprived Gonzales of her property interest protection under 
the statute and the restraining order. 
Despite the limitations of the majority and concurring opinion, Justice 
Stevens’s dissent probably relies on the wrong legal theories to answer those 
arguments.  Justice Stevens analogizes Gonzales’s interest in her restraining 
order to the property interest she would have had in a contract with a private 
security company to provide protection.257  This analogy fails to distinguish 
between a contract, where two parties enter an agreement, and a statutory 
provision which merely provides unilateral protection to a specific group of 
citizens.258  By framing the issue around this argument,259 the dissenting 
Justices base their arguments on a mere analogy, rather than a clear, 
identifiable right.  Such an approach may actually expand property interests 
protected by the Due Process Clause beyond a comfortable limit.260 
In sum, the Court should have recognized that Gonzales had a property 
interest in seeing the restraining order enforced.  She did not have such a right 
because it is analogous to a contractual right.  Instead, Gonzales had a 
legitimate expectation that when her legislature mandated that police “shall” 
use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order, including arrest,  the 
legislature never intended the word “shall” to mean “may.”  The Court should 
have recognized this property interest as legitimate enough to warrant Due 
Process Clause protections. 
Nevertheless, seven Justices agreed with the Court’s decision in 
Gonzales.261  Lower federal courts will most likely follow the Court’s dicta 
that Gonzales did not state a claim under § 1983.  Victims should not rest on an 
argument that this part of the opinion was mere dicta. 
This casenote examines ways that domestic violence victims and society in 
general can combat domestic violence after the Gonzales decision.  The first 
question is whether society should develop legal procedures to protect victims.  
 
 256. The officer has no discretion on whether to arrest the perpetrator if the perpetrator is 
present.  Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2814 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He does have discretion in how to 
seek the arrest warrant.  Id. at 2805.  Here, the officer has clerical discretion: what information to 
include in the arrest warrant application, for example.  Id. 
 257. Id. at 2813 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 258. See id. at 2803-05.  Furthermore, Gonzales never claimed anything like a contractual 
right to enforcement of the statute.  Id. at 2803.  Gonzales retained the independent right to 
initiate contempt proceedings against her husband if he violated the restraining order.  Id. at 2805. 
 259. Id. at 2813 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 260. Cf. id. at 2803 (A person “clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire . . . . 
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it” (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))). 
 261. Id. at 2800. 
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If society agrees that legal remedies are necessary, the next question is what 
kind of legal remedies will be most effective.  This casenote suggests that civil 
liability for police departments that fail to respond vigorously to domestic 
violence calls may be a vital piece of the puzzle necessary to effectively 
combat domestic violence in the United States. 
A. Should Society Develop Legal Remedies for Domestic Violence Victims? 
Some scholars have argued that legal remedies may not be the best 
approach to deal with the problem of domestic violence.262  Reasons for this 
vary.263  To some extent, the legal system may penalize those women who 
honestly want to stay with their abusers.264  In addition, legal proceedings can 
be costly, possibly forcing the victim to forgo other non-legal services.265  
Legal involvement can also incite more violence from the abuser, as he 
attempts to punish such independent behavior.266  The legal system will 
usually not respond to “mere” verbal, emotional, or economic abuse.267 
Nevertheless, the legal system plays a vital role in the lives of women who 
seek protection from their abusers.  Family members and social service 
agencies cannot threaten an abuser with jail time or civil penalties for his 
abusive behavior.  The inability of the legal system to serve the needs of all 
women in domestic violence situations is no excuse to abandon all efforts at 
developing legal options for those women who have turned to the legal system 
for relief.268  For those women who have called on the legal system for 
protection, the legal system must not arbitrarily turn a blind eye or ignore its 
duties to answer that call. 
B. What Kind of Legal Remedies Will Be Most Effective? 
Legislative remedies for domestic violence may be proactive or reactive.  
An example of proactive policy is the creation of the Office on Violence 
 
 262. See Goodmark, supra note 22, at 19-23. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 19-21.  One could certainly argue to what extent a woman would want to stay w ith 
her abuser.  Actually measuring the frequency of women who would stay would be very difficult; 
a researcher would have to devise a way to distinguish honest answers from coerced answers.  
Nevertheless, this casenote concedes that it is at least possible that some women would want to 
stay. 
 265. Id. at 22. 
 266. Id. at 23. 
 267. Id. at 29-30. 
 268. By analogy courts do not abandon their efforts at contract law because some parties may 
wish to stay in unenforceable contracts for non-legal reasons (e.g., maintaining a good business 
relationship with a big client).  See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI ET AL., COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 5 (2d ed. 2003).  Similarly, lack of legal remedies is no 
reason to abandon contract law.  Cf. id. at 5-6. 
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Against Women (OVW) in the U.S. Department of Justice in 1995.269  Since 
1995, the OVW has handed out about $2 billion in grant funds to state law 
enforcement agencies throughout the United States.270  In addition, President 
George W. Bush has announced a program for the creation of fifteen domestic 
violence victim service and support centers throughout the United States.271  
These centers promise to consolidate all of the social service, criminal justice, 
economic, and spiritual needs of their clients.272  While these centers are a 
promising development, their effects are unknown.  Society should continue to 
develop more effective alternative solutions. 
Many states have also enacted proactive mandatory arrest laws. 273  These 
laws have enhanced the arrest rates on domestic violence calls in their 
respective jurisdictions.274  These laws have two drawbacks.  First, where they 
impose no civil liability, police departments may not necessarily respect the 
statute.  This was probably the case in Castle Rock, Colorado.  Consequently, 
police departments are left only with political consequences for failing to act.  
While this may be a powerful deterrent if the department fears a high-publicity 
case, such as Gonzales, it will not guarantee that a police department will 
respond to every domestic violence call it receives.  Second, even where the 
arrest rates may climb, police departments may still fail to respond adequately 
enough.275 
Civil protection orders are another proactive attempt to combat domestic 
violence.276 Protection orders allow an abuse victim to employ the legal system 
to prevent her abuser from harassing her.277  However, to be effective, such 
restraining orders must be enforced.  This requires police to arrest abusers 
when they violate protection orders.  Where, as in Gonzales, police refuse to 
enforce such restraining orders, they become nothing more than a paper shield, 
providing the victim with no protection whatsoever. 
 
 269. See Office on Violence Against Women, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ovw/ 
overview.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks at the Opening of the St. Louis Family Justice Center, 
(Jan. 12, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_ 
060112.html.).  The President has funded these centers with $20 million. Id.  As of January 12, 
2006, six centers have opened in Oakland, San Antonio, St. Louis, and Brooklyn.  Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See supra note 26. 
 274. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: 
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 
14 (1999) (In the District of Columbia, arrest rates rose from 5% to 41% from 1991 to 1996.) 
 275. See id. (even after improvement, D.C. police arrested a perpetrator less than half the 
time). 
 276. See Goodmark, supra note 22, at 10. 
 277. Id. 
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Finally, revised custody statutes may help domestic violence victims when 
they share a child with their abuser.278  A revised custody statute may require a 
court to consider allegations of domestic violence when determining a custody 
arrangement.279  This may sometimes prevent attempts by the abuser to use 
custody of children as yet another tool for controlling his victim.280  Still, these 
laws will not work where evidence of domestic violence is weak.  Nor will 
they protect a childless victim. 
In summary, society has taken many proactive steps to combat domestic 
violence.  In addition to non-legal remedies, such as social services, family, 
and friends,281 state and federal lawmakers have provided for massive funding 
of domestic violence prevention programs.282  Lawmakers have required 
mandatory arrest of perpetrators, and they have revised civil laws to provide 
more tools for victims of domestic violence.283  Still, domestic violence 
persists.  A more reactive approach in our legal system may supplement the 
proactive policies in eradicating domestic violence. 
One reactive approach may already exist: a woman might successfully sue 
a police department that has ignored her protection order under a claim that the 
police department failed to provide her with equal protection under the law. 284  
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state 
may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”285  Women seeking protection from gender bias in public housing have 
successfully brought lawsuits under this theory.286  If one views gender bias in 
public housing and domestic violence in the home as two points along a 
spectrum of violence against women, this further supports an argument for an 
equal protection claim in cases like Gonzales.287 
In order to support an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must prove that: 1) 
inadequate police response to domestic violence calls is gender discrimination, 
 
 278. Id. at 12. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See id. at 9. 
 282. See Office on Violence Against Women, supra note 268. 
 283. Goodmark, supra note 22, at 15, 10. 
 284. See Browne, supra note 1, at 1314-16. Gonzales may have erred in failing to bring a 
claim under this theory.  Nevertheless, one could see why Gonzales relied on a due process claim 
rather than an equal protection claim.  By claiming violation of due process, Gonzales avoided the 
burden of proving discriminatory intent. 
 285. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV., § 1. 
 286. See, e.g., Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 1985 WL 13505 *1 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).  
The tenant had refused to pose nude for the landlord or to have sex with the landlord.  Id.  The 
court found that the plaintiff stated a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act because the act 
recognizes sexual harassment as a form of gender discrimination.  Id. 
 287. Cf. Beverly Balos, A Man’s Home Is His Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic 
Violence and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 78 (2004). 
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and 2) the police intentionally discriminated against victims of domestic 
violence based on gender.288  The first element should be easy to prove 
because virtually all victims of domestic violence are female.289  “In fact, the 
history of profound gender inequality in the government’s treatment of wife-
beating makes the problem one of core constitutional concern.”290  A plaintiff 
may show discriminatory intent by demonstrating that the lack of 
responsiveness is based on stereotypical notions of gender roles or unconscious 
sexism.291 
Still, equal protection claims may not be universally successful.  First, the 
Supreme Court repeatedly ruled against allowing civil rights claims under § 
1983 to impose liability on municipalities where the municipality has failed to 
act.292  Second, equal protection claims may be hard to prove. 293  In an equal 
protection claim, the plaintiff carries the extra burden of proving that police 
responses to domestic violence calls actually constitute gender 
discrimination.294  In addition, the plaintiff must prove intent to 
discriminate.295 
If equal protection claims will not work to encourage police to enforce 
protection orders, then perhaps state legislatures can enact legislation that will 
motivate police departments by creating financial consequences for failing to 
respond to domestic violence calls.  Indeed, in Gonzales the Court explicitly 
recommends this approach as a way of putting teeth into mandated arrest 
statutes.296  Under this approach, a legislature has two options: 1) provide for 
reductions in a police department’s budget when it fails to respond to domestic 
violence calls, or 2) provide victims of domestic violence a state cause of 
action when a police department ignores a protection order. 
The first option has several benefits but many limitations.  The first benefit 
is that legislatures could re-emphasize any proactive spending policies to 
prevent domestic violence.297  Where spending provisions for domestic 
 
 288. Browne, supra note 1, at 1314-15.  The plaintiff would base her theory on the fact that, 
because domestic violence victims are predominantly female, police inaction in these cases 
provide females with less protection against assault and battery laws than the police provide 
males from these crimes.  Id. at 1315. 
 289. Id. at 1316. 
 290. Joan Meier, Battered Justice for Battered Women, WASH. POST, March 22, 2005, at A 
25. 
 291. See Browne, supra note 1, at 1315. 
 292. Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193 
(1989), and Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803-04 (2005). 
 293. See Browne, supra note 1, at 1314-1315. 
 294. Id. at 1314. 
 295. Id. at 1315. 
 296. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2810. 
 297. See Office of Violence Against Women, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
fy2004grants/welcome.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). This map provides links to spending 
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violence programs could easily get lost amongst the various other law 
enforcement spending programs, a penalty provision might draw the attention 
of policy-makers.298  The second benefit is that a legislature should be able to 
accurately predict costs so as to pressure police departments without crippling 
them financially. 
Nevertheless, the drawbacks of such a program are numerous.  First, a state 
legislature or executive oversight committee may not have a strong motivation 
to carefully scrutinize a police department’s practices.  Such scrutiny may 
whither under political pressure to provide robust funding to police 
departments, and it may lead to arbitrary decisions.  Also, this kind of program 
could lead to significant oversight costs. 
In comparison, a private cause of action overcomes these limitations.  Any 
problems inherit in a private cause of action can be overcome by placing limits 
on these causes of action.  Where a political body may not have a strong 
motivation to carefully examine a police department for limitations, a domestic 
violence victim will have strong incentives to challenge a police department 
that has ignored her protection order.  By subjecting such claims to the 
procedures of a civil trial, this approach should be less susceptible to arbitrary 
outcomes.  It will also be open to the public.  The plaintiff will bear the burden 
of investigating the police department’s actions, not the state.299 
Still, this program would have several limitations.  First, unpredictable jury 
verdicts could run the risk of crippling police departments, especially if the 
plaintiff seeks and receives punitive damages.  The legislature could correct 
this by prohibiting punitive damages.300  Moreover, the substantial burdens of 
actually proving that the police department’s actions actually caused the 
plaintiff’s harm and proving exactly what harms that failure caused should 
serve as an inherent limitation on the number of suits filed against police 
departments.  This statute could also lead to significant litigation costs for 
police departments.  A legislature could correct this by providing that court and 
legal fees be paid by the plaintiff in frivolous cases.  The largest hurdle for this 
type of program would most likely be unpredictability in police budgets.  
However, a legislature could prevent this by capping the damages allowed.  
Further, local police departments could share the risk of such lawsuits by 
purchasing insurance.  In some situations, municipalities would be too risky to 
insure.  However, this would actually further encourage lagging police 
 
programs in each of the fifty states.  Id.  Budget expenditures include provisions for homeland 
security, bullet proof vests, drug training, and other programs.  Id. 
 298. Cf. id. 
 299. Court fees may add to the cost of this program, but the legislature could provide that the 
losing party in such a case carry this burden. 
 300. Many states already provide for limited recoveries from municipalities.  See, e.g., 745 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-102 (2002) (prohibiting collection of punitive damages from local 
government). 
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departments to develop strong domestic violence policies and enforce those 
policies uniformly. 
Some states have already allowed for civil liability in these situations.301  
Some states, such as Massachusetts, have refused to impose municipal liability 
without specific legislative action.302  As more states implement these policies, 
domestic violence advocates will get a better idea of which policies are more 
effective in combating domestic violence. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to give Gonzales a fair shot at convincing a trial court that her 
police department deprived her of her due process rights when they failed to 
enforce her restraining order.  Instead, the Court denied Gonzales’ claim, 
cutting off one legal avenue of recourse for domestic violence victims. 
Still, domestic violence victims and society have several options remaining 
to combat domestic violence.  Victims and advocates must always be aware of 
non-legal resources, such as counseling, social services, family, and friends.  
They must also be aware of the legal options currently available.  These 
include civil restraining orders, mandatory arrest laws, revised custody laws, 
and funding for police departments to fight domestic violence.  Where poor 
police response to domestic violence calls limits the efficacy of these legal 
remedies, victims have two options.  Currently, they may bring an equal 
protection claim against a police department that fails to enforce their 
protection order.  However, victims and advocates should consider asking their 
legislators to provide for a private cause of action against those same police 
departments.  A cause of action created under a specific state statute will 
provide more concrete protection to victims who have been harmed by the 
failures of law enforcement to act.  That protection would arise from the strong 
motivation to pursue domestic violence calls vigorously and uniformly. 
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